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I. INTRODUCTION

Common law tort immunity for state officials is a relatively new
phenomenon in West Virginia because the state has long enjoyed constitutional
immunity from suits.1 There are two general forms of common law immunity:
judicial immunity and qualified immunity.2 Judicial immunity refers to absolute
immunity for judges and legislators based on their official acts. 3 Generally,
qualified immunity protects public officials for certain discretionary acts performed
1

See Parkulo v. West Virginia Bd. of Probation, 483 S.E.2d 507, 517 (W. Va. 1996).

2

See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132 (5th ed.

1984).
3

See id
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as part of their duties. In addition, the public duty doctrine (although not a form of
common law immunity in the strict sense) serves the same function by immunizing
a public officer from suit based on his breach of a general duty owed to the public
at large. However, a public officer does have a duty under the public duty doctrine
if there is a "special relationship" between the public official and the person
harmed by the official's negligence.6
The standards for common law immunity for state officers find their
genesis in two basic sources. Primarily, the standards evolved from common law
immunity cases concerning municipal public officials. 7 Other standards evolved
from federal immunity law in response to suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8
However, the law of immunities in its common law form remained discordant in
terms of its application to state officers in West Virginia until Parkulo v. West
Virginia Board of Probation.9 Parkulo is a 1996 decision by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals that addresses a suit by a rape victim against the West
Virginia Board of Probation and Parole and the West Virginia Division of
Corrections.1 0 Finding that the Board of Probation and Parole could claim quasijudicial immunity and that the Division of Corrections could claim immunity under
the public duty doctrine, the decision recognized common law protection for the
state and state employees in actions brought under West Virginia Code § 29-12-5."
Although Parkulo went a long way toward clarifying common law immunities in
West Virginia, the decision left several avenues open to further expansion and
litigation.
Section II of this comment traces common law immunity in West Virginia
through its evolution on the state and municipal level in order to demonstrate both
the geneses of the various standards and the interplay between the two. Section III
discusses the Parkulo decision itself. In sections IV through VI, this comment
traces the origins of judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and the public duty
doctrine and discusses how these doctrines were incorporated into West Virginia
law and how the Parkulo decision applies each of these doctrines to state officials.
Finally, section VII discusses the current state of common law immunity for state
officials and what lies ahead in future litigation.

4

See id.

5

See Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36,40 (W. Va. 1989).
See id.

6

7

See Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 517.

8

See id. at 521.

9

483 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996).

10

See id. at 511.

11

See id. at 511-25.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

Common Law Immunity for MunicipalitiesandMunicipalOfficers

The evolution of common law immunity for state officers is interwoven
with the evolution of sovereign immunity and the evolution of common law
immunity for municipalities. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the evolution of
municipal common law immunity in order to track the development of the common
law immunity standards in this state. The very notion of sovereign immunity finds
its roots in the ancient doctrine of "the divine right of the King who could do no
wrong., 12 In its purest form, sovereign immunity "protects governments at all
levels from legal action. 13 The doctrine was extended to municipalities in England
through the decision of Russell v. Men of Devon.'4 The decision of Mower v.
Leicester 5 adopted the English common law rule of sovereign immunity in this
country.1" Thus, the state, as well as its subdivisions, was immune from suit based
on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 7
In West Virginia, the initial grant of sovereign immunity stems from the
West Virginia Constitution. 8 Article VI, § 35 of the West Virginia Constitution
states:
The State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any
court of law or equity, except that the State of West Virginia,
including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein, or
any officer, agent, or employee, thereof, may be made defendant
in any garnishment or attachment proceeding, as garnishee or
suggestee. 19
The protections afforded to the states were also applied to political subdivisions in
a series of cases dating back to 1890.20 In addition, West Virginia courts applied the
12

Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 851 (W. Va. 1975). See also Edwin M. Borchard,

Government Liabilityin Tort, 34 YALE LJ.1, 2 (1924).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1033.
13
14

See Long,214 S.E.2d at 851 (citing Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) and

holding that an individual could not maintain an action against a political subdivision of the state for injury
resulting from negligence in the performance of any governmental function).
15

9 Mass. 247 (1812).

16

See Long, 214 S.E.2d at 853.

17
18

See id.
See iLat 850.

19

W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.

See Long, 214 S.E.2d at 850. See also Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 37 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va. 1946); Hayes
v. Cedar Grove, 30 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1944); Brown's Adm'r v. Guyandotte, 12 S.E. 707 (W. Va.1890).
20
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rule that a municipality or other local entity could be held liable if it negligently
performed a proprietary act.21 However, beginning with the decision in
Higginbothamv. City of Charleston2 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
began to make sweeping changes in the law of immunities in West Virginia.
Higginbotham v. City of Charleston held that the grant of sovereign
immunity to the state under Article VI, § 35 of the West Virginia Constitution did
not apply to municipalities.2 3 Following the Higginbotham decision came the
landmark 1975 decision of Long v. City of Weirton.24 Long held, in part, that "[t]he
rule of municipal governmental immunity is now abolished in this State." 25 In
reaching its decision, the court in Long examined the history of municipal
government immunity in West Virginia.26 Essentially, the Long decision traced the
rule of municipal government immunity from the Men of Devon decision through
1975.27 The court concluded that the traditional analysis of municipal government
immunity in this state was erroneous because the State of Virginia had not adopted
the common law rule supplying municipalities with immunity until after 1867.28
Therefore, West Virginia's constitutional incorporation clause 29 did not include the
common law doctrine of municipal governmental immunity because that doctrine
was not part of Virginia common law at the time the state was created. 3 0 Thus, the
court abolished the rule of governmental immunity as it applied to municipalities. 31
Following Long, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applied the
same basic reasoning to the abolition of common law immunity for county
commissions 32 and county boards of education,33 effectively stripping these
political subdivisions of the immunity they had enjoyed for so long.34 As a result,

21

See Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36,42 (W. Va. 1989).

22

204 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1974), overruled on other grounds, O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237

S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977).
23
See Higginbotham,204 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 4.
24

214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975).

25

Long, 214 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 10.

26

See id.
at 850-59.

27

See id.

28

See Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 517.

29

See W. VA. CONST.art. VIII, § 13.

30

See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 517.

31

See id.

32

See Gooden v. Webster County Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1982) (abolishing sovereign

immunity for county commissions).
33

See Ohio Valley Contractors v. Wetzel County Bd. of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437 (W.Va. 1982)

(abolishing sovereign immunity for county boards of education).
34

See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 518.
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local officials bought liability insurance to protect their funds against lawsuits.'
However, insurance companies began raising premiums and canceling policies
based upon "the 'litigiousness' of our society and a perceived uncertainty regarding
the regulatory authority these subdivisions possess."36 In response, the West
Virginia Legislature passed the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform
Act.37 The Act's stated purpose is "to limit liability of political subdivisions and
provide immunity to political subdivisions in certain instances and to regulate the
costs and38 coverage of insurance available to political subdivisions for such
liability."
Section 29-12A-5 establishes the statutory basis of tort immunity for
political subdivisions. 39 However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
applied the common law public duty doctrine in cases where there is an "alleged
failure of a local governmental entity to provide any, or sufficient, fire or police
4 The public duty doctrine states that "a local
protection to a particular individual."o
governmental entity's liability for nondiscretionary (or 'ministerial' or
'operational') functions may not be predicated upon the breach of a general duty
owed to the public as a whole; instead, only the breach of a duty owed to the
particular person injured is actionable." 41 In this context, "non-discretionary
functions" are those imposed by regulatory or penal statutes that do not vest a
public officer with the discretion to enforce or not enforce them. 42 Section 29-12A5 governs tort actions for damages proximately caused by "the negligent
performance of acts by their employees while acting within the scope of
employment."4 3 Therefore, while the qualified immunity provisions for public
employees under section 29-12A-5 are predicated upon a theory of immunity, the
public duty doctrine is formulated upon the premise of negligence. 44 Thus, the
notion of the public duty doctrine was first enunciated in West Virginia in 1989 in
order to plug one of the holes in section 29-12A-5. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals grafted the standards of these cases onto the jurisprudence
governing the common law immunity of state officers in similar situations.
Municipal employees are also frequently subject to suit under the federal

as5

See Johnny M. Knisely, II, Comment, Tort Reform: The Reemergence of Local Governmental

Immunity, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 466,466 (1987).
36

Id.

37

W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1 to 18 (1999).

38

W. VA. CODE

39

W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5 (1999).

40

Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dep't, 412 S.E.2d 737, 747 (W. Va. 1991).

41

Id. (citing Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 387 S.E.2d 307, 310 (W. Va. 1989)).

42

See Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36,38 (W. Va. 1989).

43

W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-4(c)(2) (1999).

44

See Benson, 380 S.E.2d at 37.

§ 29-12A-1 (1999).
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civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These suits are not within the purview of state
municipal immunity doctrine because they refer to federal standards. However,
these same standards have been used to generate the foundation of qualified
immunity for state officials. 45 The most notable of these cases is Bennett v.
Coffman,46 a 1987 decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
Bennett is a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a police officer for civil
rights violations.47 In deciding the case, the court applied the federal qualified
48 The court restates
immunity standard enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
the test
as: "[g]ovemment officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." 49 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeals, for the first time,
endorsed the federal test for qualified immunity embodied by Harlow. This
endorsement is important in terms of the evolution of state official immunity
doctrine, as discussed below.
The evolution of municipal government tort immunity is important for this
discussion because, as indicated above, the municipal standards determined many
of the current standards for state officials.' However, the evolution of judicial
immunity is not closely linked to a similar evolution because it is a far older and
more ingrained doctrine. As such, it will be treated at length later in this comment.
B.

Common Law Immunity for States and State Officers

The basic grant of sovereign immunity stems from the West Virginia
Constitution, which provides that the State should never be made a defendant in
any court of law or equity.51 Likewise, the State and its agencies performing
statewide functions are entitled to absolute immunity from suit.5 2 The only
exception to the constitutional grant of absolute immunity is garnishment or
attachment proceedings.5 3 The essential policy basis for this severe bar against
litigants seeking to sue the State is to protect public money from diversion from

45
46

See State v. Chase Sec., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591, 594 (W. Va. 1992).
361 S.E.2d 465 (W.Va. 1987).

47

See id. at 465.

48

See id.
at 467 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

49

Id.at 465.
See Parkulo v. West Virginia Bd. of Probation, 483 S.E.2d 507 (W.Va. 1996); State v. Chase

50

Sec., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1992).
51

See W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.

52

See 17 M.J. States § 27, at 282 (1994). See also Hesse v. State Soil Conservation Comm., 168

S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 1969) (holding that the grant of constitutional immunity extends to agencies of the state).
53

See State v. Sims, 43 S.E.2d 805, 815 (W. Va. 1947).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss2/8

6

Shuman: Common Law Tort Immunity for State Officials in West Virginia aft
COMMON LAW TORT IMMUNITYFOR STATE OFFICIALS

2000]

267

4
"legislatively appropriated purposes."5 However, this broad ban against suits has
never fully protected state officials.'
In this regard, "an injunction to restrain or require a state officer to perform
a ministerial duty is not prohibited."' Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has held that "suits against officers acting, or threatening to act, under
allegedly unconstitutional statutes, have been held not to be suits against the
State."'5 In addition, the court has held that "mandamus has been permitted to
require the state road commission to institute proper condemnation proceedings
upon the taking or damaging of land for public purposes."' ' Finally, the court has
held that "mandamus may be employed to compel state officers who have acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or outside the law, to perform their lawful duties." 9 Thus,
the West Virginia Supreme Court has never enforced the sort of absolute ban
against suit applicable to the state and its agencies to state officers. However, the
types of actions listed above pertain to injunctive and declaratory relief. The issue
of pursuing suits against state officials for their malfeasance for monetary damages
is a different issue.
At the onset of this discussion it is important to state that the suits seeking
monetary damages against the state are regulated initially by the state's liability
insurance provisions. 60 For state liability insurance, the statute that controls such
issues is section 29-12_5.61 Section 29-12-5 states in pertinent part that:

The board shall have general supervision and control over the
insurance of all state property, activities and responsibilities,
including the acquisition and cancellation thereof; determination
of amount and kind of coverage, including, but not limited to,
deductible forms of insurance coverage, inspections or
examinations relating thereto, reinsurance, and any and all
matters, factors and considerations entering into negotiations for
advantageous rates on and coverage of all such state property,
activities and responsibilities. Any policy of insurance purchased
or contracted for by the board shall provide that the insurer shall
be barred and estopped from relying upon the constitutional

4
55
6

57

Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 359 S.E.2d 124, 129 (W. Va. 1987).
See Pittsburgh Elevator v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 310 S.E.2d 675, 685 (W. Va. 1983).

Id.

58

Id
d

59

Id

60

See W. VA. CODE § 29-12-1 to 18.

See Parkulo v. West Virginia Bd. of Probation, 483 S.E.2d 507 (W.Va. 1996); Eggleston v. W.
Va. Dep't of Highways, 429 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1993); State v. Chase Sec. Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va.
1992); Pittsburgh Elevator v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 310 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1983).
61
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immunity of the state of West Virginia against claims or suits:
Provided, That nothing herein shall bar the insurer of political
subdivisions from relying upon any statutory immunity granted
such political subdivisions against claims or suits. The board may
enter into any contracts necessary to the execution of the powers
granted to it by this article. It shall endeavor to secure the
maximum of protection against loss, damage or liability to state
property and on account of state activities and responsibilities by
proper and adequate insurance coverage through the introduction
and employment of sound and accepted methods of protection and
principles of insurance. 2
Essentially for this discussion, this provision "authorizes the State Board of
Insurance to procure liability insurance on behalf of the State..,63
In 1983, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided Pittsburgh
Elevator v. West Virginia Board of Regents.64 The case, in part, discussed the
interplay between the state's immunity from tort and insurance purchased by the
state to insure against tort liability. 65 In this regard, the court held that "[s]uits
which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought
under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the
traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State."'' The court further
expanded this proposition in Eggleston v. W. Va. Dept. of Highways,67 which held
that:
W.Va. Code, 29-12-5(a) (1986), provides an exception for the
State's constitutional immunity found in Section 35 of Article VI
of the West Virginia Constitution. It requires the State Board of
Risk and Insurance Management to purchase or contract for
insurance and requires that such insurance policy "shall provide
that the insurer shall be barred and estopped from relying upon the
constitutional immunity
of the State of West Virginia against
68
claims or suits.
Finally, the court explained its position in the decision of State ex rel. W.Va. Dept.

62

W. VA. CODE § 29-12-5 (1999).

63

PittsburghElevator, 310 S.E.2d at 680.

64

310 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1983).

65

See Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 514.

66

PittsburghElevator,310 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 2.

67

429 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1993).

68

Eggleston, 429 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 1.
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of Transportation,Highways Division v. Madden69 where the court said that "these
cases stand for the proposition that coverage for such liability accruing from
alleged negligent acts by the State is covered by the limits of the State's liability
insurance coverage and not state funds."70 Therefore, in essence, these cases carved
out a broad exception to immunity for states and state officials in that the State is
required to purchase liability insurance where necessary under section 29-12-5 to
protect against suits based on negligent acts by the State. As a result, the primary
justification for state immunity (i.e. protection of public funds from diversion from
legislatively appropriated purposes) is no longer applicable where the state has an
available insurance policy. 71
The evolution of liability insurance for the state is of crucial importance to
this discussion because it is clear that "the Legislature has enacted W.Va. Code §
29-12-5 to provide some level of redress in the courts to those allegedly injured by
the actions of the State."7 2 On the other hand, although section 29-12-5 indicates
that municipalities are still vested with statutory immunity, the section does not
mention common law immunity nor does it mention what protections are available
to the state.73 As a result, a broad reading of section 29-12-5 indicates that where
there is liability insurance, no immunity is available for the state or state officials.
This prospective analysis paved the way for the 1992 decision of State v. Chase
Securities, Inc7 4 which applied qualified immunity to state officials acting within
the scope of their authority 7 and the later decision of Parkulo v. West Virginia
Board of Probation76 which applies all common law immunities and the public
duty doctrine to state officials. 77 These two decisions, in turn, are the crux of
common law immunities for state officials in West Virginia.
III. THE PARKULO DECISION
A.

Facts
7 8 stems from
The decision in Parkulo v. West Virginia Boardof Probation

69

453 S.E.2d 331 (%V.Va. 1994) (per curiam).

70

Madden, 453 S.E.2d at 334.

71

See Mellon-Stuart Co., 359 S.E.2d 124, 129 (W. Va. 1987).

72

Parlado,483 S.E.2d 507, 516.

73

Id

74

424 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1992).

75
76

Id. at syl. pt. 1.
483 S.E.2d 507 (V. Va. 1996).

77

Id. at 521-26.

78

483 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996).
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the beating and rape of Chandra Parkulo by Dawson McCrary, Jr.79 McCrary, a
convicted criminal who had recently been paroled from prison, hit Parkulo with his
car while she was walking across the campus of Marshall University in Huntington,
West Virginia.80 He then "struck appellant in the head with a blunt object and
dragged her into the vehicle. ...

,8

McCrary left the scene and later, "repeatedly

raped appellant, sexually assaulted [Parkulo] with a screwdriver, beat her, and
eventually left her nude beside the roadway near the West Virginia-Kentucky state
line.",8 2 A motorist discovered Parkulo by the road and took her to the hospital for
treatment.8"
McCrary was later arrested in Kentucky, tried and convicted for his crimes
involving Parkulo, and sentenced to prison where he subsequently died." Parkulo
alleged that at the time he committed the crimes against her "he had been released
from prison by the West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole and was then
under parole supervision by the West Virginia Department of Corrections."8
B.

ProceduralHistory

Parkulo brought an action in January of 1994 naming the West Virginia
Board of Probation and Parole and the West Virginia Division of Corrections as
defendants. The complaint "sought recovery from the two public bodies, as
entities, and did not seek recovery against their respective officers or employees. 8 7
Parkulo's complaint alleged that:
[T]he Board, in granting McCrary parole, and the Division of
Corrections, in supervising McCrary while he was on parole,
violated their respective statutory duties, acted outside the scope
of their respective official responsibilities, and, through their
respective employees, acted negligently, in bad faith, and in a
wanton and reckless manner. As a proximate result, the complaint
alleged, appellant was injured, for which she sought damages.88

79

See id. at 511.

80

See id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 511.

84

See id.

85

Id.

8

See id.

87

Id.

88

Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 511.
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There was also apparently a motion to amend the complaint, but according to the
court the record "does not reflect the proposed amendments."89
Thereafter, the West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole filed a motion
to dismiss on March 1, 1994.90 In its motion, the Board of Probation asserted that
"it was immune from suit because its function in granting or denying parole is
judicial or quasi-judicial in nature and asserted that the employees of the Board
were acting in the scope of their authority." 91 The Division of Corrections served its
answer nine days later on March 10, 1994.92 In its answer, the Division of
Corrections denied many of allegations contained in the complaint and also "raised
several affirmative defenses, including the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
doctrine of qualified immunity, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, lack of
duty owed to the plaintiff, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction."'
In a letter dated February 1, 1995, the circuit judge announced that the
motion to dismiss would be granted.' The judge stated that "I am of the opinion
that the act of granting parole is a judicial or quasi-judicial function and that there
is absolute immunity from liability as to each of these defendants."9 5 Subsequently,
the court entered an order granting the Board of Probation's motion to dismiss with
prejudice on April 12, 1995 on the theory that the suit was barred by judicial or
quasi-judicial immunity9 However, as the opinion letter indicates, the judge
dismissed the complaint against both defendants despite the fact that the Division
of Corrections had not moved for dismissal. 97 As a result, on April 24, 1995 the
appellant served a motion on the court to reconsider its dismissal order.98 In
response, the Division of Corrections filed a motion for summary judgment on
August 14, 1995 alleging that the Division owed no duty to Parkulo based on the
public duty doctrine." After a hearing, the court, by an order dated September 15,
1995, denied the appellant's motions and granted the Division's motion for
summary judgment." The court found that the appellant could not meet the
requirements of the "special relationship doctrine," thus barring her claims against

89

Id.

90

See Id.

91
92

Id.
See id.

93

Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 511.

94

See id.

95

Id. at 512. (emphasis in original).

9

See id.

97
98

See Id
See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 512.

99

See id.

100

See id.
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the Division under the public duty doctrine.'0 ' Parkulo's appeal was based on the
order of September 15, 1995.102
C.

Issues

Essentially, Parkulo made two assignments of error.10 3 First, she contended
that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim against the Board of Probation
because the Board does not enjoy judicial immunity.' 04 Second, she claimed that
the trial court erred in dismissing the claim against the Division of Corrections
because the Division does not enjoy immunity under the public duty doctrineY' 5
The court acknowledged two legal concepts for review:
(1) That the Appellees, as instruments of the State, are entitled to
claim some form of governmental immunity arising from the
common law independently of the sovereign immunity granted the
State by our Constitution, and
(2) That the Appellant can not maintain an action in negligence
for any breach of Appellee's duties to enforce regulatory and
penal statutes, because such duty is owed to the public generally
and not to a particular person harmed by any such breach." °
The court used these two questions as a springboard to examine the general law of
common law immunities in West Virginia and their applicability to the State and its
officials.
D.

Holding

Initially, the court discusses the grounds and procedure for suits made
against the state or state officials. The court begins by reaffirming the holding in
PittsburghElevator v. West Virginia Boardof Regents,'0 7 holding that suits against
the State's liability insurance, under its limits, are not barred by traditional notions
of sovereign immunity.10 8 The court also reaffirms the holding in Eggleston v. West

101

See id.

102

See id.

103

See Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 513.

104

See id.

105

See id.

106

Id.

107

310 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1983).

108

See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 1, (citing Pittsburgh Elevator v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents,

310 S.E.2d 675, syl. pt. 2 (W. Va. 1983)).
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Virginia Dept. of Highways," 9 which held that W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)
provides an exception to the state's constitutional immunity under Article VI, § 35
of the West Virginia Constitution where the State has bought liability insurance
pursuant to section 29-12A-5.' Parkulo then holds that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals will not address suits brought under W. Va. Code § 2912-5 unless "it is alleged that the recovery sought is limited to the applicable
insurance coverage and the scope of the coverage and its exceptions are apparent
from the record."' "1. The court also holds that:
The Legislature may direct such limitation or expansion of the
insurance coverages and exceptions applicable to cases brought
under W. Va. Code § 29-12-5, as, in its wisdom may be
appropriate. The Legislature has also vested in the State Board of
Insurance (Risk and Insurance Management) considerable latitude
to fix the scope of coverage and contractual exceptions to that
of the terms of particular
coverage by regulation or by 1negotiation
2
applicable insurance policies.
Finally in this regard, the court holds that:
If the terms of the applicable insurance coverage and contractual
exceptions thereto acquired under W. Va. Code § 29-12-5
expressly grant the State greater or lesser immunities or defenses
than those found in the case law, the insurance contract should be
applied according to its terms and the parties to any 13suit should
have the benefit of the terms of the insurance contract.
Thus, the court discusses the interplay between the State's insurance policies and
case law, and establishes the procedure for suits under W. Va. Code § 29-12-5.
Following this procedural background the court discusses common law
immunities as they apply to the state and state officials. The court holds that:
Unless the applicable insurance policy otherwise expressly
provides, a State agency or instrumentality, as an entity, is
immune under common-law principles from tort liability in W.Va.
Code § 29-12-5 actions for acts or omissions in the exercise of a
legislative or judicial function and for the exercise of an
109

429 S.E.2d 636 fV. Va. 1993).

110

See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 2, (citing Eggleston v. W. Va. Dep't of Highways, 429 S.E.2d

636, syl. pt. I (f. Va. 1993)).
Ill

Parlado,483 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 3.

112

Id. at syl. pt. 4.

113

Id.at syl. pt. 5 (emphasis in original).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 103, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:261

administrative function involving the determination of an
administrative function involving
the determination of
114
fundamental governmental policy.
In addition, the court extends common law immunity to state officials
performing "judicial, legislative, and executive (or administrative) policy-making
acts and omissions"" 5 The court also extends this coverage to public officials who
are "acting within the scope of [their] authority."' 1 6 Finally, the court applies the
public duty doctrine to "the State and its instrumentalities, unless the doctrine is
'' 7
expressly waived or altered by the terms of the applicable insurance contract."
Therefore, in essence, the court applies all common law immunities to state
officials in actions under W. Va. Code § 29-12-5.
This is but a brief overview of the effect of Parkulo upon the doctrine of
common law immunities. A longer more exhaustive analysis of the evolution and
the current state of judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and the public duty
doctrine follows this analysis of the Parkulo decision.
E.

Reasoning

In establishing a broad base of common law immunity for the state and
state officials the court is mindful of the "slippery slope" of limiting the state's
liability in tort actions.118 However, the court concludes that:
[I]t is deceptively inviting to conclude that no common-law
immunities apply which are not expressly set out in the State's
insurance policies, and that a private action should therefore lie for
the breach of any duty by any agency or instrumentality of the
State. Under that analysis, in the absence of immunities and other
defenses unique to the status of a prospective defendant as an
instrument of government, a private suit might lie against the
Legislature -if not legislators- for any number of real or
imagined deficiencies in legislation, appropriations, or other
actions, or against the courts-if not judges and other quasijudicial officers-for any negligence alleged in judicial processes
and against a variety of public offices, agencies, or
instrumentalities, so long as the alleged wrong is covered by
insurance and not expressly excluded by the terms of the policy or

114

Id. at 509-10, syl. pt. 6.

115

Id. at 5 10, syl.pt. 7.

116

Parkulo,483 S.E.2d atsyl.
pt. 8.

117

Id.atsy. pt. 10.

118

Id.at 516.
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policies.' 19
Therefore, the court reasons that common law immunities are necessary to shield
the State and State officials from suits based on any number of pretexts simply
because the State has liability insurance covering that officer, instrumentality, or
agency. Thus, the court applies common law immunities to the State and State
officials in order to protect against the erroneous and inequitable notion of a suit
against a legislator (judge, state official, agency, or instrumentality) for a perceived
or actual injury to a particular citizen or citizens, at least under certain
circumstances discussed later in this comment.
IV. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
A.

HistoricalEvolution

The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is "as old as the law.""12 Floyd
v. Barker121 is a 1607 decision which contains one of the earliest formulations of
the doctrine of judicial immunity. 22 In Floyd, Lord Coke, holding that judges were
immune from suit, stated that:
[T]he reason and cause why a Judge, for any thing done by him as
Judge, by the authority which the King hath committed to him,
and as sitting in the seat of the King (concerning his justice) shall
not be drawn in question before any other Judge, for any surmise
of corruption, except before the King himself, is for this; the King
himself is dejure to deliver justice to all his subjects; and for this,
that he himself cannot do it to all persons, he delegates his power
to his Judges, who have the custody and guard of the King's
1
oath. 2

Thus, Lord Coke determined that judges were immune from suit because implicit in
their grant of authority to do the King's justice is an extension of the King's own
absolute immunity from suit.
The United States Supreme Court addressed judicial immunity in two early
cases: Randall v. Brigham124 and Bradley v. Fisher.125 The Supreme Court in
119

Id.

120

Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868).

121

77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).

122

See Roush v. Hey, 475 S.E.2d 299,305 (W.Va. 1996).

123

Floyd,77 Eng. Rep. at 1307. (emphasis inoriginal).

124

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).

125

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
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Randall applied judicial immunity to a justice of the Massachusetts Superior
Court. 126 The Court stated that "[judges] are not liable to civil actions for their
judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless perhaps
where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly. ' 127 The
Supreme Court further discussed the doctrine of judicial immunity in Bradley
where the Court held that "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are
not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of
their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.' 128 It
should be noted that these decisions, with few exceptions, render a judge
completely immune from suit based on his judicial acts. As a result, judicial
immunity is sometimes referred to as "absolute."
The earliest formulation of judicial immunity in West Virginia is Fausler
129 In
v. Parsons.
an 1873 decision which cites Bradley, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that "[i]t seems, therefore, settled that where the subject
matter and the person are within the jurisdiction of the courts, the judge, whether of
a superior or inferior court, is not subject to a civil action for any matter done by
him in the exercise of his judicial functions',' 130 Thus, the court's decision is very
much in keeping with the broad and sweeping doctrine enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Bradley and Randall. In fact, as the Supreme Court of
Appeals states so eloquently, Fausler"began an unbroken line of cases committing
this State to the common law rule that shields a judge from liability for any act
131
taken in the exercise of a judicial duty.
Beginning in the late 1960's, the United States Supreme Court discussed
the limitations and expansions of the ancient doctrine of judicial immunity in four
important decisions. 32 First, the Court held in the 1967 decision of Pierson v.
Ray' that a judge is immune from damages for false conviction even if the judge
is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.' 34 Second, in Imbler v. Pachtman,'35
a 1976 decision, the Court held that prosecutors are entitled to judicial immunity
for damages in a civil suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'36 Third, in Stump v.

126

See Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 523-24.

127

Id. at 536.

128

Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.

129

6 W. Va. 486 (1873).

130

ld. at 491.

131

Roush, 475 S.E.2d at 303.

132

See Pritchard v. Crouser, 332 S.E.2d 611,614 (W. Va. 1985).

133

386 U.S. 547 (1967).

134

See id. at 554.

135

424 U.S. 409 (1976).

136

See id. at 431.
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Spar/anan,3 7 a 1978 decision, the Court held that a judge is immune from damages
resulting from an ex parte sterilization order. 138 Finally, in Pulliam v. Allen,139 a
1984 decision, the Court acknowledged that there are exceptions to a judge's
absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.140
These four United States Supreme Court cases set the stage for a triad of
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cases: Pritchardv. Crouser,14 1 Carey v.
Dostert,142 and Roush v. Hey.' 43 Pritchard, decided in 1985, analyzed judicial
immunity based upon a combination of West Virginia and federal law. 144 The court
in Pritchardfirst reaffirmed the standard for judicial immunity, holding that
"[w]hen acting in his judicial capacity a judge is immune from civil liability for any
and all official acts. '145 The court then laid out the policy reasons for judicial
immunity that it had gleaned from the federal cases listed above. 146 The court
identified the three main policy reasons for shielding judges from civil liability as
follows: "(1) the preservation of judicial independence; (2) the need for finality in
lawsuits; and, (3) the existence of another remedy against judicial excess in the
form of appellate review."147 Thus, the court reaffirmed the doctrine of judicial
immunity and laid out a framework for the reasoning behind the doctrine.
In Carey, a 1991 decision, the court held that:
A judge acting in his judicial capacity who provides the public
with information contained in the public record, whether through
the press or otherwise, or distributes copies of pleadings or other
official court documents which are a part of the public record does
not thereby give up the protection of judicial immunity. 48
Thus, the court applies the absolute doctrine to prohibit suit against a judge for
49
distributing court documents to the public prior to filing it with the clerk.'
137

435 U.S. 349 (1978).

138

See id at 364.

139

466 U.S. 522 (1984).

140

See id at 544.

141

332 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1985).

142

406 S.E.2d 678 (W. Va. 1991).

143

475 S.E.2d 299 (%V.
Va. 1996).

144

See Pritchard,332 S.E.2d at 614-17.

145

Id at 614.

146

Id. at 615.

147

Id.

148

Carey,406 S.E32d at syl. pt. 2 (emphasis in original).

149

Id. at 679.
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However, in Roush, a 1996 decision, the court first reformulated the test for judicial
immunity by holding that "[t]o determine when absolute judicial immunity protects
a judge from civil liability, we apply a two-part test: absolute judicial immunity
applies (1) to all judicial act [sic]; unless (2) those acts fall clearly outside the
judge's subject matter jurisdiction."'ro The court further holds that:
There is a two-factor test for determining whether a judge's act is
a 'judicial' one. The first factor is whether the act was a function
normally performed by a judge. This turns on the nature of the act
itself and not on the identity of the actor. The second factor is
whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity;
this factor looks to the expectation of the parties."' 1
Roush streamlines and clarifies the analysis of judicial immunity in West Virginia.
However, the striking thing about the case is that the court finds that Judge Hey
was not entitled to judicial immunity for his appearance on CNN's "Crossfire,"
during which he discussed a case still pending in his court.15 2 Therefore, by 1996,
the law of judicial immunity was very well developed and, in essence, was still
very much true in substance to Lord Coke's opinion in Floyd v. Barker,5 3 which
was handed down almost four hundred years ago.
B.

The Effect of the Parkulo Decision

In terms of pure judicial immunity as it applies only to judges, the court in
Parkulo merely states that "we do not disturb our holding in Roush v. Hey, 197
W.Va. 207, 475 S.E.2d 299 (1996), allowing an action to be brought where a
judge's alleged actions were determined to be non-judicial acts and, therefore, were
not cloaked with judicial immunity."15 4 Therefore, in terms ofjudicial immunity as
it applies to judges, Roush v. Hey is still the leading case describing the analysis
and the application ofjudicial immunity.
The court concludes that the West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole
is immune from Parkulo's suit because it determines that the Board of Probation
and Parole is a "quasi-judicial body., 15 5 The court holds, as an initial proposition,
that:
Unless the applicable insurance policy otherwise expressly
provides, a State agency or instrumentality, as an entity, is
150

Roush, 475 S.E.2d at syl pt. 4.

151

Id. at syl. pt. 5.

152

See id. at 301-307.

153

77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).

154

Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 524.

155

Id. at 525.
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immune under common law principles from tort liability in W.Va.
Code § 29-12-5 actions for acts or omissions in the exercise of a
legislative or judicial function and for the exercise of an
administrative function involving the determination of
fundamental governmental policy.'
The court further holds that:
The common law immunity of the State in suits brought under the
authority of W.Va. Code § 29-12-5 (1996) with respect to judicial,
legislative, and executive (or administrative) policy-making acts
and omissions is absolute and extends to judicial, legislative, and
executive ls(or administrative) officials when performing those
functions. 7
In stating that judicial, executive, and legislative agencies and officials are
"absolutely" immune from suit under common law principles, the court essentially
states that those agencies or officers are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The
major point here is that now so long as an agency or official is performing a
judicial, legislative, or executive act, they are entitled to absolute judicial or "quasijudicial" immunity under the principles invoked in Roush v. Hey. The effect here is
extraordinary in the sense that for the first time in this state, certain officials who
are not judges, legislators, or prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for suit.
Therefore, the court clearly indicates that quasi-judicial immunity extends beyond
the judiciary to agencies and officials of the executive branch performing quasijudicial functions. This is a severe bar against suits directed at these officials and
agencies because absolute immunity implies that these officials and agencies do not
even have to defend the merits of the case.
The ramifications of this aspect of the decision are quite broad. At the time
of writing, no case has fully discussed the ramifications of Parkulo in this regard.
Thus, because quasi-judicial immunity is so broad and sweeping in this format,
there is no precise estimate as to how far the new protection extends. As a result,
suits against officials or agencies under the State's liability insurance contracts
must be carefully pleaded so as not to invoke the quasi-judicial immunity
protections.
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

A.

HistoricalBackground

The doctrine of qualified immunity, unlike judicial immunity, does not
trace its roots from ancient precedent. In fact, as the West Virginia Supreme Court
156

Id. at syl. pt. 6.

157

M at syl. pL 7.
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of Appeals notes in State v. Chase Securities, Inc.,'58 "our law with regard to public
official immunity is meager."1"9 However, prior to the Parkulo decision, Chase
Securities was the leading case concerning qualified immunity for state officials.' 60
Therefore, Chase Securities is perhaps the best focus for a discussion of qualified
immunity for state officials. In that case, the defendant was sued by the State for
damages because of its alleged complicity in the loss of approximately $7.1 million
from the Consolidated Fund. 161 The defendant, Chase Securities, Inc., then filed a
third party complaint against Arch A. Moore, Jr., A. James Manchin, and and Glen
B. Gainer, Jr. who were, at the time, the Governor, the Treasurer, and Auditor
respectively. 162 The third party defendants (Moore, Manchin, and Gainer) put forth
a defense predicated upon qualified immunity. 163 As previously noted, state
officials prior to the PittsburghElevator'" decision were immune from most suits
based on sovereign immunity. The third party defendants relied on State ex rel.
Boone NationalBank of Madison v. Manns1 65 for their qualified immunity defense.
In Manns, members of the Lincoln county commission were sued because they had
expended funds in excess of the year's levy.1' 6 In that case the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that:
No public officer is liable to one dealing with him for the illperformance of an official act, if he is legally vested with
discretion, or must use his own judgment, as to the manner or
method of performing such act. Judicial and legislative officers
are, accordingly, ordinarily immune from such liability, and are
not even required to give bond. Other officers in performing acts
which involve personal discretion likewise incur no personal
liability in the absence of fraud.167
Therefore, the Court in Manns essentially says that public officers are not liable in
tort for discretionary acts. This dichotomy, more precisely the dichotomy between
discretionary and ministerial acts, is at the core of the doctrine of qualified

158

424 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1992).

159

Id. at 593.

160

See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 520.

161

See Chase Securities, 424 S.E.2d at 592-93.

162

Id. at 592.

163

Id. at 593.
310 S.E.2d 675 (W.Va. 1983).

165

29 S.E.2d 621 (W. Va. 1944).

166

See id. at 622-23.

167

Id. at 623-24.
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immunity.'8
The dichotomy between ministerial acts and discretionary acts is defined
as follows:
It is usually said that the immunity protects acts within the scope
of the officer's duty only if the acts are "discretionary." This
means, more or less, that the acts involve some fairly high level of
policymaking. Acts that do not qualify as "discretionary" acts are
usually called "ministerial," and for purely ministerial acts of
executive officers or employees there is no immunity. Acts that
create direct personal risks to others and acts involving ordinary
considerations of physical safety are usually in this category
where there are no serious governmental concerns. 6
Under that analysis, a public officer is not liable in tort for his acts if they are
discretionary but the same officer is liable for his acts if he fails to satisfy a
ministerial duty that is imposed by law. 70 In holding that the third party defendants
in State v. Chase Securities, Inc. 1 were immune under the doctrine of qualified
immunity, the court does away with the dichotomy between ministerial and
discretionary acts altogether.1 72
The court in Chase Securities holds that:
[A] public executive official who is acting within the scope of his
authority and is not covered by the provisions of W. Va. Code, 2912A-1, et seq., is entitled to qualified immunity from personal
liability for official acts if the involved conduct did not violate
clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have
known. There is no immunity for an executive official whose acts
are fraudulent, malicious, or otherwise oppressive. To the extent
that State ex rel. Boone National Bank of Madison v. Manns,
supra, is contrary, it is overruled. 73
Thus, in its decision the court establishes a standard for qualified immunity that is
not contingent upon the dichotomy between ministerial and discretionary acts.1 74 In
fact, earlier in the opinion the court decried the dichotomy as "highly arbitrary and

168

See

169

Id. at 1060.

170

See id

171

424 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1992).

172

Id. at 599-600.

173

Id

174

See id.

KEETON, ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 1060.
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difficult to apply. '175 However, the exact origin of this standard requires some
elucidation.
As in the doctrine of judicial immunity, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals relies heavily upon federal law for the evolution of its qualified
immunity standard. 176 As noted earlier, the source of many federal immunity
standards is jurisprudence based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suits.lU7 The court
in Chase Securities states that section 1983 litigation "has resulted in a substantial
body of law regarding immunity for public officials.0 78 Most notable among these
decisions are three United States Supreme Court decisions cited by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Chase Securities: Burns v. Reed,179 WesOfall
6 and Harlow v. Fitzgerald.81 First,
v. Erwin,"'
the Court noted in Burns that "[t]he
presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect
government officials in the exercise of their duties."'18 2 In Westfall, the Court noted
that
The purpose of such official immunity is not to protect an erring
official, but to insulate the decision making process from the
harassment of prospective litigation. The provision of immunity
rests on the view that the threat of liability will make83 federal
officials unduly timid in carrying out their official duties.
Finally, the test upon which the Court bases its holding in Chase Securities was
first announced in Harlow.'84 In Harlow, the United States Supreme Court held that
"government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. 18 5 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first discussed this

175

Id.at 599.

176

See generally Martin v. Mullins, 294 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1982) (uses federal immunity law to

create a right to indemnification for attorney's fees, monetary judgments, and costs incurred by a public
official in defending a civil action).
177
See infra. § II(A).
178

Chase Sec., 424 S.E.2d at 594.

179

500 U.S. 478 (1991).

180

484 U.S. 292 (1988).

181

457 U.S. 800 (1982).

182

Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87.

183

Westfall, 484 U.S. at 295.

184

See Chase Sec., 424 S.E.2d at 597.

185

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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standard, as noted above, in Bennett v. Coffman,1" a 1987 decision by the court
which mirrored the United States Supreme Court's holding in Harlow.87 Thus, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, for the first time, adopted the qualified
immunity standard that prevails in federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals discussed qualified
8 According to the Parkulo court, that decision
immunity again in Clarkv. Dunn."
"appeared to resurrect the distinction between 'discretionary' and 'nondiscretionary' governmental functions, although it clearly applied the Chase
rule., 189 Thus, prior to Parkulo the dominant standard in qualified immunity
jurisprudence in West Virginia was the Harlow rule as restated by the Court in
Chase Securities.1' 9
B.

Effect of the Parkulo Decision

From the outset, the court was not specifically asked to address the
doctrine of qualified immunity for state officials. However, the court uses the broad
nature of common law immunity, as well as the inherent interplay between each of
the several doctrines, as a springboard to clarify the whole. In this regard, the court
first endorses the ChaseSecurities standard quoted above as the applicable standard
for qualified immunity which governs suits brDught under W. Va. Code § 29-125.191 The court also holds that:

[W]e conclude that, in cases arising under W. Va. Code § 29-12-5,
and in the absence of express provisions of the insurance contract
to the contrary, the immunity of the State is coterminous with the
qualified immunity of a public executive official whose acts or
omissions give rise to the case. However, on occasion, the State
will be entitled to immunity when the official is not entitled to the
same immunity; in others the official will, be entitled to immunity
when the State is not. The existence of the State's immunity of the
State must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 92
The second part of the court's holding with regard to the extent of the immunity of
the state and the official is somewhat perplexing. However, the court suggests that
the reason behind it is that ordinarily a state official's qualified immunity is

186

361 S.El.d 465 (W.Va. 1987).

187

See id. at 465.

188

465 S.E.2d 374 (W.Va. 1995).

189

Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 521.

19o

See also Goines v. James, 433 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1993).

191

See Parkulo,483 S.E.2d at 523, (citing ChaseSec., 424 S.E.2d at 591-592).

192

Id. at 524.
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coterminous with the state's except where vicarious liability will not be imputed to
the state because an official acts "beyond the scope of his authority or by
fraudulent, malicious, or otherwise oppressive conduct."'1 93 Thus, the court
mandates a case-by-case analysis in order to determine whether an official's
194
conduct is covered under the Chase Securities standard that the court endorses.
Despite the fact that the court was not specifically asked to analyze
qualified immunity for state officials, its decision goes a long way toward
clarifying the law of qualified immunity in West Virginia. Because the court agrees
with the Chase Securities standard, it effectively rids West Virginia qualified
immunity jurisprudence of the troublesome dichotomy between ministerial and
discretionary functions. The standard announced in Chase Securities and endorsed
by Parkulo essentially defines covered conduct as that which "did not violate
95
clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have known."'
Thus, the court effectively simplifies and clarifies the law of qualified immunity for
state officials in West Virginia.
VI. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE

A.

HistoricalEvolution

On a national level, the public duty doctrine is somewhat older than
qualified immunity, but it is certainly still in its nascence compared to judicial
immunity. As noted earlier, the public duty doctrine is not truly a form of
governmental immunity. However, the doctrine "in practice achieves much the
same result. ' 9 The origin of the doctrine in this country stems from South v.
Maryland,'97 an 1855 decision by the United States Supreme Court. In that case the
Court applied English law to find that a sheriff had no duty to secure the release of
a kidnapping victim, even though he knew that the victim had been kidnapped and
where the victim was being held. 98 The Court held that the sheriffs duty was "a
public duty, for neglect of which he is amendable to the public, and punishable by
indictment only.""
As noted previously, the public duty doctrine was engrafted into the
jurisprudence of this state under municipal immunity law.20 The first West
Virginia decision addressing the public duty doctrine and its special relationship
193
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exception is Benson v. Kutsch.20 1 Benson was a suit arising out of an alleged
negligent failure by the city to properly inspect a building, which allegedly led to
injuries by the plaintiff that he sustained in a fire. 202 Finding that the City of
Wheeling was entitled to immunity under the public duty doctrine and relying
solely on foreign authority, the court held that the public duty doctrine "simply
stated, is that a governmental entity is not liable because of its failure to enforce
regulatory or penal codes. 20 3 In addition, the court held that "[i]f a special
relationship exists between a local governmental entity and an individual which
gives rise to a duty to such individual, and the duty is breached causing injuries,
then a suit may be maintained against such entity." 2 " Thus, a governmental entity
is not liable for a failure to enforce regulatory or penal statutes, unless a special
relationship exists.20 5
The court clarifies the notion of a "special relationship" in Wolfe v. City of
Wheeling.2 6 Wolfe was a suit brought in Ohio County Circuit Court in which the
plaintiffs alleged negligent breach of conduct for the fire department's failure to
respond to a fire at their home. 207 The court, remanding the case for the circuit court
to decide whether a special relationship existed, establishes the four-part test for a
"special relationship" as:
(1)[A]n assumption by the local governmental entity, through
promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the
party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the local
governmental entity's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3)
some form of direct contact between the local governmental
entity's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's
justifiable reliance on the local govemmental entity's affirmative
undertaking?'c
Again, in this decision the court relies on foreign authority, in this case New York
and Ohio law, in order to determine its special relationship test.20 ' Therefore, to
summarize the court's holding in Wolfe, in order for a cause of action to lie for a
breach of the public duty doctrine, the government must create a duty separate from
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its duty to the public with the injured party through its actions.21
The stage was set for the court's next analysis of the public duty doctrine
in Randall v. Fairmont City Police Departzent.211 The decision essentially limits
the broad use of the public duty doctrine as formulated in Benson and Wolfe.212 The
court defines the public duty doctrine such that "a local governmental entity's
liability for nondiscretionary (or 'ministerial' or 'operational functions') may not
be predicated upon the breach of a general duty owed to the public as a whole. 213
Thus, the court states that the public duty doctrine is only applicable when the
conduct, act, or omission in question is non-discretionary in nature.214 As a result,
the court limits the application of the public duty doctrine to situations in which the
alleged conduct is a violation of an official's duties that are mandatory by law.215
It is clear from the cases discussed above that the law with regard to the
public duty doctrine and the special relationship exception was well developed
prior to Parkulo insofar as it was applied to municipalities. As we will see, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals extends this coverage even further.
B.

Effect of the Parkulo Decision

The court finds that nothing in the record indicated that the West Virginia
Board of Probation and Parole owed any duty to Parkulo because the Board did not
create a special relationship with her.216 The court also applies the public duty
doctrine to the state and state officials holding that "[t]he public duty doctrine and
its 'special relationship' exception apply to W. Va. Code § 29-12-5 actions against
the State and its instrumentalities, unless the doctrine is expressly waived or altered
by the terms of the applicable insurance contract. 2 17 The court further holds that
"[i]n cases arising under W. Va. Code § 29-12-5, the question of whether a special
duty arises to protect an individual from a State governmental entity's negligence is
ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of facts., 21' Finally, the court endorses the
Wolfe special relationship test quoted above as the special relationship test
applicable to the state and its instrumentalities. 219 Thus, the court essentially
engrafts the jurisprudence of the municipal public duty doctrine into the State's

210

See id.

211
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common law immunity jurisprudence.
The final result of the Parkulo decision in this regard is that the state and
its instrumentalities are no longer liable for alleged negligent acts arising from a
failure to enforce a discretionary regulatory or penal statute unless a special
relationship exists. Therefore, the court supplies the state, its instrumentalities, and
its officials with a very effective means to ward off suits based on their alleged
negligence insofar as the alleged conduct is non-discretionary.
VII. CONCLUSION: WHAT LIES BEYOND PARKULO?
The Parkulo decision mandates a broad and sweeping grant of common
law immunity for the state and state officials. This grant, in many respects,
undermines the very function of W. Va. Code § 29-12-5, which supposedly
supplies a means of redress for injured parties against the state.220 Therefore, the
issue becomes whether the doctrine of common law immunity will continue to
insulate the state and its officers to such a high degree, or whether the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals will abrogate these broad protections. The
answer, of course, is unclear. The trend, as indicated in this comment, is to protect
the state and its officers from most liability. However, this apparently defeats the
valid public policy underlying W. Va. Code § 29-12-5 which is to provide a means
of redress. Thus, the Parkulo decision serves to blockade the relief granted to
injured parties by statute.
There are at least three possible courses. First, the West Virginia
Legislature could enact statutory immunity for the state and state officials in
section 29-12-5 actions much like they did in the Govemmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act."2 ' Second, the court itself could abrogate these immunities
further as in Randall v. FairmontCity Police Department. 22 Finally, the court may
preserve the status quo and continue to endorse sweeping protections on the
common law level for the State and state officials.223 Only time, and further
litigation, will tell the tale.
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